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Abstract 
 Global warming is bringing rapid change to the Arctic. Th e melting of sea ice and glaciers is 
increasing faster than scientists predicted even a year ago. Environmental change is forcing 
legal and economic developments, which in turn will have serious environmental and social 
consequences. However, the potential for conflict has been greatly exaggerated. Th e 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) has established the international legal regime 
governing the division of ocean space, sovereign rights over ocean resources, protection of the 
marine environment and the conduct of activities in and under the Arctic Ocean. Further-
more, a number of global environmental and maritime conventions apply to the Arctic. All 
the land territory, with its resources, is subject to national jurisdiction, as are the maritime 
zones proceeding seawards to the limits set out in the LOSC. While there is no multilateral 
political organisation with the power to regulate activities or to take legally binding decisions, 
there is a cooperative mechanism in the Arctic Council. Once all the maritime boundaries in 
the Arctic are delimited, the exploitation of resources can begin. However, first, precautionary 
measures should be adopted to ensure that the environment is protected as much as possible 
from increases in shipping and fishing as well as oil and gas development. Th is would require 
the elaboration of a regional seas agreement for the Arctic, incorporating elements of the Arctic 
Council, that reiterates the general principles in Part XII of the LOSC as well as those in 
the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, including the precautionary approach and the ecosystem 
approach. 
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 Introduction 
 On 2 August 2007, a Russian submarine planted a flag on the Arctic seabed, 
bringing to a theatrical climax several months of headlines on Arctic issues. 
Hardly a day passes, without media reports and photographs of melting ice 
and distressed polar bears. Global warming is bringing rapid, rather alarming 
change to the Arctic, and the melting of sea ice and Greenland glaciers is 
increasing faster than scientists predicted even a year ago. Th e consequences 
of climate change for the Arctic are many and inter-connected. Th ey are 
legal, political, social, economic and environmental. Environmental change is 
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 forcing legal and economic developments, which in turn will have serious 
environmental and social consequences. However, the potential for conflict 
has been greatly exaggerated. 
 Th e symbolic gesture of the planting of a Russian flag was highly mislead-
ing. Contrary to some commentators’ fantasies of a new “cold war”, the five 
Arctic coastal states are not engaged in a military or economic conflict in the 
melting north. Th ere is no “gold rush” or race for unclaimed resources. Th e 
Arctic coastal states are only rushing to meet a deadline to collect scientific 
data to support their claims to an “outer continental shelf ” over 200 nautical 
miles (nm) from their coasts on the seabed of the Arctic Ocean.1 Contrary to 
some media reports, they are not claiming either additional land territory or 
the “North Pole”. Th e North Pole does not even exist in a real physical sense. 
It is just a notional point in the midst of the ice-bound Arctic Ocean, which 
is surrounded by the land territories of Canada, Denmark (for Greenland), 
Norway, Russia and the United States. 
 Furthermore, neither the planting of flags nor military might will deter-
mine which state has sovereign rights over the mineral and fisheries resources 
of the Arctic. Th e 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(LOSC)2 has established the international legal regime governing the division 
of ocean space, sovereign rights over ocean resources, protection of the marine 
environment and the conduct of activities in and under the Arctic Ocean. 
Th us, all ocean-related issues fall to be governed by the provisions of the 
LOSC. All the land territory, with its resources, is subject to national jurisdic-
tion, as are the maritime zones proceeding seawards to the limits set out in 
the LOSC. 
 As for the Arctic region as a whole, both land and sea, there is no over-arching 
international legal regime and no multilateral political organisation with the 
power to regulate activities or to take legally binding decisions. However, 
there is a cooperative mechanism: the Arctic Council, created by the eight 
states in the region3 as a forum for discussion of all issues in the Arctic, in 
particular the protection of the environment, sustainable development and 
the interests of the native people.4 In addition, there are a number of global 
1  Th e deadline is 2009 or ten years from their ratification of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (LOSC). 
2  Adopted at Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, in force 16 November 1994, 21 ILM 1245 
(1982). 
3  Th e five Arctic coastal states, plus Finland, Iceland and Sweden. 
4  See Joint Communiqué and Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (1996) 35 
ILM 1382. 
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environmental and maritime conventions that apply to the Arctic with respect 
to various activities and sources of environmental degradation. 
 In the light of misleading media reports and a statement by the European 
Commission5 citing territorial claims, sovereignty disputes, and the threat of 
war over territory and resources, it seems advisable to clarify the physical and 
political status of the Arctic, to outline the main economic and environmental 
issues, and to consider whether a new legal regime is necessary, especially in 
view of the massive environmental and economic changes already taking 
place, with more to come in the very near future. 
 Background
Th e Physical, Political and Legal Situation in the Arctic 
 Th e Arctic consists of a large body of water—the Arctic Ocean—surrounded 
by land, which is under the sovereignty of the five Arctic coastal states: Canada, 
Denmark (for Greenland), Norway, Russia and the United States. Although 
their coasts do not abut the Arctic Ocean, Finland, Iceland and Sweden are 
also considered to be Arctic states, as their territory extends to the Arctic 
Circle, at about 66˚32ˊN. Th e sovereignty of these states over their land terri-
tory is not in dispute, except for Hans Island, which is claimed by both Can-
ada and Denmark. Canadian sovereignty over the islands in the Arctic 
Archipelago has never been challenged. However, there is active disagreement 
about the status of the waters between the Canadian islands, the fabled North-
west Passage. 
 Th e so-called race to claim “the North Pole” relates to claims by the Arctic 
coastal states for an outer continental shelf (seabed), extending from their 
coasts and lying beneath the waters surrounding the geographic North Pole. 
Other claims relate to a number of unresolved bilateral maritime boundary 
disputes between the states in the region. Under the law of the sea, each coastal 
state has jurisdiction and sovereign rights over resources in the water column 
and the seabed up to 200 nm from its coasts. Beyond that limit, the waters are 
high seas, open to all states, but a portion of the seabed may be claimed by 
coastal states if they can prove that it constitutes a “natural prolongation” of 
their land territory. 
5  “Climate Change and International Security”, Paper from the High Representative and the 
European Commission to the European Council, S113/08, 14 March 2008, available at: 
www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/reports/99387.pdf. 
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 Most of the ocean and the land territory of the Arctic have been frozen ever 
since human beings arrived. When Western Europeans first ventured into the 
Arctic, various native peoples had inhabited the land territory and some had 
used the sea ice for many thousands of years. At present, approximately 10% 
of the four million inhabitants in the Arctic are native people from a number 
of different ethnic groups in Alaska, Canada, Greenland, Russia, and north-
ern Scandinavia (not Iceland).6 In the Canadian Arctic, the native people have 
their own quite extensive autonomous territory called Nunavut, created as a 
result of a land claim settlement.7 Greenland has a substantial degree of home 
rule, except for foreign relations. 
 Environmental Change in the Arctic 
 Climate change is having a dramatic impact on Arctic ecosystems and severe 
repercussions are expected to increase in the future, as temperatures continue 
to rise. Recent scientific studies have indicated that temperatures in the Arctic 
are increasing twice as quickly as elsewhere, and that various feedback effects 
are causing glaciers and sea ice to melt at an unprecedented rate.8 Th e Green-
land glaciers have been thinning more rapidly than expected, and melted 
water under the ice sheets is causing accelerated sliding towards the sea. Th e 
melting of all Greenland glaciers could cause several metres of sea level rise, 
adding considerably to the sea level rise already caused by thermal expansion. 
 Sea ice in the Arctic has decreased in volume and extent to unprecedented 
levels, leaving the Northwest Passage completely free of ice at the end of the 
2007 summer season and open to navigation for the first time in recorded 
6  Information on website of the Arctic Council; available at: http://www.arctic-council.org. 
7  Nunavut (the Inuktitut word for “our land”) was created as a territory of Canada on 1 April 
1999 as a result of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, adopted into law by the Canadian 
Parliament in the Nunavut Act (1993, c.28, N-28.6) and the Nunavut Land Claims Act 
(1993, c.29, N-28.7), available at: http://laws.gc.ca.en/result. 
8  Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), 2005, Cambridge University Press, 1042 pp., 
website: http://www.acia.uaf.edu; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Fourth 
Assessment Report: O.A. Anisimov, D.G. Vaughan, T.V. Callaghan, C. Furgal, H. Marchant, 
T.D. Prowse, H. Vilhjálmsson and J.E. Walsh, 2007: Polar regions (Arctic and Antarctic). Cli-
mate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II 
to the Fourth Assessment, Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson, (eds.), Cam-
bridge University Press, pp. 653–685; UNEP, GEO 4, Chapter 4, Water, 2007, website: 
http://www.unep.org. Th e scientific information in this article on the consequences of climate 
change in the Arctic has been synthesized from all the reports listed above, as well as from the 
individual research papers and governmental websites referred to in the footnotes. 
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history. Melting sea ice is exposing greater areas of darker water, causing 
increased absorption of heat from the sun and further melting. On 1 October 
2007, the US National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC)9 announced that 
sea ice in September was at its lowest known level and 25% lower than the 
previous low set in 2005. At the same time, the Northern Sea Route north of 
Russia, while relatively free of ice in the west, was still blocked in places in the 
east. NSIDC scientists predicted that sea ice might disappear by 2030, poten-
tially opening up the Arctic to ice-free year-round shipping and to offshore 
mineral exploration and exploitation. Yet, this could happen even sooner. 
In December 2007, another group of scientists concluded that the latest 
modelling studies indicate that northern polar waters could be ice-free in 
summer by 2012–2013.10 
 Melting ice on land, including from permafrost, glaciers and rivers means 
sea levels will rise, and more freshwater entering the oceans will change their 
composition and their circulation patterns. Melting rivers will also convey 
more sediment, nutrients and contaminants to coastal areas. Sea level rise, 
permafrost melting and stronger wave action are causing coastal erosion. Th e 
tree line is moving northwards, but forest fires and increasing numbers of 
pests are killing the trees. Th e melting permafrost is potentially causing dam-
age to settlements and infrastructure, including buildings, roads and pipe-
lines. Furthermore, methane gas currently frozen underground in permafrost 
could be released when the frost melts, thereby increasing the greenhouse 
effect that causes global warming. Methane is a more potent greenhouse gas 
than CO2. 
 Because of these changes in Arctic ecosystems and in their habitats, both 
the flora and fauna have to adapt to new circumstances and some might not 
be able to survive. Polar bears are likely to become extinct because they travel 
and hunt over sea ice, which is diminishing in extent and duration. Further-
more, their main food is seals, which are also endangered. Bears in the Hud-
son Bay area of Canada are in poor condition due to insufficient food and are 
not producing as many cubs as usual. Because seals use the ice as a breeding 
habitat, they are having difficulty reproducing due to a reduction in sea ice. 
Reindeer/caribou cannot feed properly, because in place of easily removed 
snow covering the mosses and lichens they live on, changing temperatures 
 9  See http://nsidc.org/news/press/2007_seaiceminimum/20070810_index.html. For the most 
recent news, click on Arctic Sea Ice News and Analysis. Spring 2008 observations point to a 
significant decrease in the thickness and extent of sea ice. 
10  Presentation by Professor Wieslaw Maslowski of the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California, to the American Geophysical Union, BBC News, 12.12.2007; AGU Fall Meeting 
2007 Abstracts, at http://www.agu.org/meetings/fm07/fm07-sessions/fm07_U33B.html. 
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have brought rain, which turns to solid ice on the ground, sealing off the veg-
etation. In addition, reindeer migratory patterns are being affected by melting 
ice. Arctic flora and fauna are also increasingly affected by insects, parasites 
and diseases, which are moving north. Some animals and fish will not be able 
to find enough to eat, as they feed on organisms living in the edges of the 
receding ice. While some fish, animals and vegetation are moving north, oth-
ers may not be able to adapt to warmer temperatures. Bird migration is chang-
ing because of loss of habitats and food sources. 
 Human Consequences of Environmental Change 
 Th e serious adverse consequences of climate change on the physical environ-
ment and on Arctic biodiversity are already affecting the lives of people in the 
Arctic who have lived by hunting, fishing, gathering and herding for thou-
sands of years. As a consequence of sea ice melting, they are increasingly pre-
vented from using the ice for hunting, fishing, and travelling. In addition, the 
animals native people have hunted for thousands of years are becoming fewer 
in number, are changing location and may even become extinct. 
 Furthermore, the melting of the permafrost and softening of the ground 
result in damage to buildings, ice roads, pipelines and other kinds of infra-
structure, including ports. Waste and contaminants that have been frozen in 
the ice will be released. Because coasts are being eroded, some settlements will 
have to move inland at considerable cost. Th e local population is already 
suffering some dislocation, and the social and cultural impacts could be quite 
severe. Further change will come along with economic development, in par-
ticular mining, oil and gas exploitation, and increased shipping and industrial 
fishing. Although the native people are adapting to these changes, many are in 
danger of losing their traditional way of life. 
 Th e Division of Ocean Space and Jurisdictional Issues 
 With a single small exception, there are no disputes concerning sovereignty 
over territory in the Arctic. Th e Arctic states enjoy absolute sovereignty and 
jurisdiction over their land territories and may take any necessary action to 
mitigate or deal with the environmental consequences of climate change and 
economic development on land.11 However, the situation with respect to 
11  Resources disputes concerning Svalbard are an exception. 
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ocean space and resources is more complex. As stated above, the LOSC pro-
vides the rules for the division of ocean space, sovereign rights over resources, 
the exercise of jurisdiction over activities and for the protection of the marine 
environment. However, in some cases resources are shared (fisheries), while 
the protection of the marine environment and conservation of marine biodi-
versity require cooperation on a regional basis. 
 Th e division of ocean space relates to the maritime zones to which coastal 
states are entitled, the bilateral maritime boundaries with other states between 
these maritime zones, and the seaward limits of their continental shelves. Th e 
outer limits of the continental shelves form the boundary between seabed 
areas under national jurisdiction and the international seabed “Area”, admin-
istered by the International Seabed Authority12 for the benefit of all states. 
Both bilateral and outer continental shelf boundaries have to be delimited 
before Arctic states and their nationals can engage in resource extraction in 
areas where sovereign rights and jurisdiction are disputed or uncertain. 
 Maritime Zones 
 Under the LOSC, coastal states are entitled to claim several maritime zones 
extending seawards from their coasts. As a first step, states have to draw base-
lines along their coasts from which the other maritime zones will be measured. 
Th ese lines will either follow the low water mark along the sinuosities of the 
coast, or be drawn as straight baselines following the general direction of the 
coast, where the coast is deeply indented or fringed with islands, as in Norway 
or the Canadian Arctic archipelago. Landward of the baselines, the sea consti-
tutes “internal waters”, over which coastal states have absolute sovereignty.13 
Foreign vessels may not enter internal waters without the permission of the 
coastal state. 
 Seawards of the baseline, states may claim a territorial sea up to a limit of 
12 nm and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) for a maximum of 200 nm 
from coastal baselines. States have sovereignty over their territorial sea; how-
ever, foreign vessels have a right of innocent passage, subject to the rules in 
Part II of the LOSC. Under Part V of the LOSC, states have sovereign rights 
12  Th e regime for the Area is set out in Part XI of the LOSC and the Agreement relating to the 
Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted 
28 July 1994, in force 28 July 1996; 33 ILM 1309 (1994). See website of the ISA for further 
information: http://www.isa.org.jm. 
13  Articles 5, 7 and 8 of the LOSC. Th e rules regarding sovereignty in internal waters are 
customary international law. 
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over the living and non-living resources of the EEZ and jurisdiction to protect 
the marine environment and control marine scientific research up to a limit of 
200 nm from the coastal baselines. 
 Under Part VI of the LOSC, all coastal states may claim a continental shelf 
(underwater extension of its land territory) up to the 200 nm limit of the 
EEZ. If the physical shelf extends beyond 200 nm, states may claim sovereign 
rights over the resources of the shelf up to the edge of its natural prolongation, 
pursuant to the rules set out in Article 76 of the LOSC. Th e resources of the 
shelf include mineral resources (mainly oil and gas) and sedentary species of 
living resources, that is, animals that are attached to the shelf or cannot move 
except in constant contact with it. Because the rights of the coastal state over 
its outer continental shelf do not affect the status of the superjacent waters, 
those waters retain their identity as high seas, open to all states. 
 Although limitations of space do not permit a full discussion, it should be 
borne in mind that in the Arctic, special problems with the determination of 
baselines will be exacerbated with the melting of sea ice and glaciers. First, in 
some cases, the edge of the ice has been used as equivalent to territory in 
establishing the baselines. Where the ice has melted to expose the actual land, 
baselines will have to be adjusted. Second, the coastal erosion described above 
may also require changes in basepoints and baselines before any delimitation 
is undertaken. 
 Th e Outer Continental Shelf  14 
 Th e LOSC provides for a legal means to determine the outer limit of the con-
tinental shelf. States are required to collect scientific information demonstrat-
ing how their claim to an outer continental shelf conforms to the provisions 
of Article 76. Th is information is presented to the Commission on the Limits 
of the Continental Shelf (CLCS or the Commission), an expert scientific body 
established under Article 76 and Annex II of the LOSC. Th e CLCS will exam-
ine the material submitted and make recommendations as to the location of 
the outer limit. Th e coastal state then must establish its outer limit on the 
basis of the recommendations. Th is procedure provides a means to establish 
limits that are internationally recognised and legally binding. Flags on the 
seabed have no legal value. 
14  Th is term is not used in the LOSC, but is used here for convenience following the prece-
dent set in the 2006 maritime boundary delimitation between Barbados and Trinidad and 
Tobago. For the text of the Arbitral Award of 11 April 2006, see the website of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration, at: http://www.pca-cpa.org. 
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 Th e real purpose of the Russian expedition in the summer of 2007 was to 
collect additional material to support the Russian claim to an outer continen-
tal shelf in the Arctic. Arctic coastal states have been preparing their submis-
sions to the CLCS to claim as much continental shelf as possible, with a view 
to exploiting its mineral resources. Russia was the first state to make a submis-
sion, in December 2001.15 After examining the submission, the Commission 
requested more data on the claim in the central Arctic, and information on its 
bilateral maritime boundaries once these were finally established. Th e CLCS 
may not make recommendations in an area that is in dispute without the 
agreement of all parties. Norway made a submission in 2006.16 Meanwhile 
Canada and Denmark are engaged in underwater surveys17 to collect data to 
support their claims. Th ey have cooperated in a joint scientific expedition to 
the Arctic to determine whether the Lomonosov Ridge is linked to their shelves. 
Russia also claims the ridge as part of the natural prolongation of its shelf. 
 As the United States is not a party to the LOSC, it cannot submit a claim 
to an outer continental shelf. However, the issue of accession to the LOSC is 
before the US Senate and some commentators believe (or hope) that the lure 
of Arctic riches could finally induce the Senate to make a positive decision.18 
In early 2008, US researchers announced that they had determined that the 
US shelf extended 100 nm further seawards than had previously been esti-
mated.19 In order to preserve its position and to present its views on technical 
issues, the United States has sent letters to the CLCS commenting on various 
submissions, including that of Russia.20 
15  See website of the CLCS at http://www.un.org/Depts/los for executive summaries of all the 
submissions, comments by other states, and statements of the Chairman of the CLCS report-
ing on the work of the Commission. 
16  Ibid. 
17  Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, “International Collaboration”, http://
geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/geo/international _collaboration-en.aspx. Canada has also dis-
cussed the possibility of collaboration with Russia and the United States. 
18  Reuters, “U.S. Senate Panel backs Law of the Sea treaty”, 31 October 2007, at http://www.
reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=USN31335584. Th e Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
has voted in favour of ratification, but the convention has to be approved by the full Senate. 
For the view of Senator Stevens, see his press release of 3 April 2008, “STEVENS CALLS 
FOR AGGRESSIVE APPROACH TO PROTECT ARCTIC OCEAN FISHERIES”. Th is 
reports on a Senate hearing in which several participants, including Senator Stevens, advo-
cated US accession to the LOSC as a means to protect and control the Arctic. See: http:// 
commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_
ID=6d0aa600-467e-4c. 
19  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), “UNH-NOAA Ocean Map-
ping Expedition Yields New Insights into Arctic Depths”, Press release, 11 February 2008, 
http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2008/20080211_arctic.html. 
20  See note 15 supra. 
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 On 18 April 2008, Denmark invited the four other countries with Arctic 
coasts to a meeting in Greenland on 27–28 May 2008 to discuss their Arctic 
claims. While it is unclear exactly what will be discussed, it is possible that 
Denmark wishes to propose collaboration in preparing claims for the CLCS. 
It also wishes states to agree not to negotiate any new Arctic treaty until the 
CLCS process is complete.21  
 Territorial and Resource Disputes 
 Th ere is only one territorial dispute in the Arctic and it is literally a very small 
one. Both Canada and Denmark claim sovereignty over tiny uninhabited 
Hans Island (1.3 square kilometres), which lies between Canada’s Ellesmere 
Island and Greenland. On 18 February 2008, Denmark announced that it 
had proposed to Canada to discuss Hans Island at the United Nations in Sep-
tember 2008. Meanwhile, Canadian and Danish scientists are establishing a 
joint weather station on the island to study winds and currents in the area. 
 Norway, as sovereign, disagrees with Iceland and Russia about the exploita-
tion of the resources around the Svalbard archipelago in the Arctic Ocean 
north of Norway. Although Norway’s sovereignty over the islands was recog-
nised in the 1920 Svalbard Treaty22 between Norway and several other states, 
the other parties were granted certain equal rights of hunting and fishing in 
the territories, as well as “liberty of access” and the right to carry on “all mari-
time, industrial, mining and commercial operations on a footing of absolute 
equality”. Th ere is some disagreement as to the meaning of these provisions 
in the light of the extended maritime zones established subsequently: the 
EEZ and the continental shelf. Do the rights of other states exist only on 
land and in the territorial sea, or do they extend to the new zones established 
since 1920?23  
 Maritime Boundaries 
 Bilateral maritime boundaries separate the maritime zones of coastal states 
where their basic entitlements to a territorial sea, EEZ and/or continental 
21  CBC News at: http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2008/04/18/arctic-meeting.html. 
22  Treaty Concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, 1920, in force 1925, 2 L.N.T.S. 7, text also 
available in the Australian Treaty series, at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/
1925/10.html. 
23  For a recent analysis, see T. Pedersen, “Th e Svalbard Continental Shelf Controversy: Legal 
Disputes and Political Rivalries”, (2008) 37 Ocean Development and International Law 339–358. 
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shelf overlap. Th e LOSC Articles 15, 74 and 83 provide basic rules for deter-
mining these boundaries in bilateral negotiations. However, if states cannot 
reach agreement in negotiations, they may opt for third party settlement 
under Part XV of the LOSC. Th ere is a choice of taking their dispute to the 
International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea, or to ad hoc arbitration under the LOSC Annex VII. 
 Th e continental shelf boundary between Canada and Greenland has already 
been delimited in a 1973 bilateral agreement, except for a small area around 
Hans Island and in the Lincoln Sea.24 However, Canada’s maritime boundary 
with the United States in the Beaufort Sea off the coasts of the Yukon Terri-
tory and Alaska is still in dispute. Th is issue may be settled by negotiation or 
adjudication outside of the LOSC.25 On the western side of Alaska, the United 
States and Russia concluded an agreement in 1990 on the delimitation of 
their boundary in the Bering Strait.26 However, thus far, the Duma (Russian 
Parliament) has refused to ratify it. Moving westwards, the maritime bound-
ary between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea is still under negotiation. 
When Norway submitted its claim for an outer continental shelf to the CLCS 
in 2006, Russia sent a letter stating that it did not object to the Commission’s 
considering the data.27 Th is means that the outer limit may be determined 
before the bilateral boundary. Some distance west of mainland Norway, the 
maritime boundary between its Jan Mayen Island and Greenland was  delimited 
by the International Court of Justice in 1993.28 Denmark and Greenland have 
concluded an agreement with Norway on the maritime boundary between 
24  Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Government of 
Canada relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Greenland and Canada, 
17 December 1973, available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/
PDFFILES/TREATIES/DNK-CAN1973CS.PDF. For a discussion of issues involved in Arc-
tic boundaries, see: A.G. Oude Elferink and D. Rothwell (eds.), Th e Law of the Sea and Polar 
Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction, Martinus Nijhoff, Th e Hague, 2001. 
25  Because Canada rejected adjudication under the LOSC by a declaration on ratification on 
7 November 2003, judicial determination of the boundary could only be effected by mutual 
consent. See Canadian declaration at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/
convention_declarations.htm#Canada. Canada and the United States have already taken one 
maritime boundary dispute to the International Court of Justice. See Delimitation of the Mari-
time Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America), ICJ Reports 1984. 
26  Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics on the Maritime Boundary, 29 ILM 941 (1990). 
27  Letter dated 21 February 2007, supra, note 15. 
28  Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), 
ICJ Reports 1993. 
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Greenland and Svalbard.29 Iceland’s boundaries with Greenland and Jan Mayen 
have been settled.30 
 Like the claims for an outer continental shelf, the bilateral maritime bound-
aries are important because they determine which state may exercise sovereign 
rights over the resources in the area of overlap in the EEZ and the continental 
shelf. Th is includes both living (fish, crustaceans and molluscs) and non-living 
resources (mainly oil and gas). 
 Economic Development in the Arctic 
 Th e warming temperatures and the melting of sea ice, permafrost and glaciers 
promise to bring economic development to the Arctic. Th e three main devel-
opments would be: 1) increased mineral exploitation, especially offshore; 
2) shipping through the Canadian Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea 
Route in the Russian Arctic, both for general cargo vessels and for tankers and 
other vessels servicing mineral development; and 3) increased fishing to follow 
fish stocks moving northwards. In addition, tourism is already expanding and 
melting sea ice should tempt cruise vessels into longer voyages. It is also pos-
sible that bioprospecting may seem attractive, for the same reasons as in the 
Antarctic, where it is a major issue.31  
 Exploitation of Mineral Resources in the Arctic 
 Since significant oil and gas reserves are already being exploited on land and 
close to shore in Alaska, Canada and the Russian Arctic, the Arctic states 
anticipate that additional reserves lie beneath the frozen ocean.32 In 2000, the 
29  Agreement between the government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of 
the Kingdom of Denmark together with the Home Rule Government of Greenland, 20 February 
2006, available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/
DNK. See analysis by A.G. Oude Elferink, “Maritime Delimitation Between Denmark/Green-
land and Norway”, 38 Ocean Development and International Law, 375–380 (2007). 
30  Agreement between Iceland and Norway of 28 May 1980 in the Continental Shelf Area 
between Iceland and Jan Mayen, 20 ILM 797 (1981). 
31  See D. Leary, “Bi-polar Disorder? Is Bioprospecting an Emerging Issue for the Arctic as well 
as for Antarctica?” (2008) 17 RECIEL 41–55 and UNU-IAS Report, Bioprospecting in the Arctic, 
United Nations University, Institute of Advanced Studies, Yokohama, Japan, 2008, 45 pp. 
32  For comprehensive information on current and possible future exploitation and its environ-
mental consequences, see “Arctic Oil and Gas 2007”, Arctic Monitoring and Assessment 
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US Geological Survey (USGS) estimated that 25% of the world’s oil and gas 
reserves lay beneath the Arctic. In 2007, it initiated a new survey based on 
improved data, the results of which should be published in the summer of 
2008.33 Before the recent melting, offshore reserves under permanent sea ice 
would have been difficult to exploit and transport. Th e melting of the ice 
should make the minerals more accessible and the transport of oil by sea much 
easier. Exploratory activities will be facilitated, as will the installation of oil 
rigs, the transport by ship of supplies and services and the transport of oil to 
markets. 
 However, visions of a “gold rush” in the Arctic might not be realised as soon 
as some anticipate, for most of the reserves are believed to be gas, rather than 
oil, and the technology to keep oil rigs ice-free has not yet been developed. 
Furthermore, scientists have warned that in the foreseeable future, melting ice 
might make Arctic waters more, rather than less hazardous (see below). In 
addition, concerns that increased exploitation of oil and gas could cause envi-
ronmental damage through accidents and disturbance of the native flora and 
fauna34 may at least delay the commencement of commercial exploitation, 
pending environmental impact assessments. 
 Onshore, in addition to oil and gas, the interest is in gold, diamonds and 
other minerals, which are already being exploited. However, while exploration 
and exploitation may become easier when the permafrost melts, transporta-
tion will become more difficult, as roads and pipelines are becoming unstable. 
Th is could lead to increased shipping to service the mining operations and to 
take the output to markets. 
 Navigation in the Arctic 
 Th e Northwest Passage (NWP) is the sea route from the Atlantic to the Pacific 
Oceans passing through the islands of the Canadian Arctic archipelago, north 
of the Canadian mainland. Until recently, the route had always been blocked 
with sea ice and was almost impassable. However, in September 2007, the 
passage was completely ice-free for several weeks. If the ice melts sufficiently 
to leave the NWP permanently ice-free during the summer months, ships 
going through it could potentially save a considerable amount of time, fuel 
and money in comparison with the existing route through the Panama Canal. 
Programme (AMAP), commissioned by the Arctic Council, available from the AMAP Secre-
tariat or online at: http://www.amap.org. 
33  USGS Energy Resources Program, see online at: http://energy.usgs.gov.arctic/. 
34  See below for information on environmental effects. 
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On the other hand, scientists and shipping experts have warned that the Arctic 
could remain dangerous for navigation for some time to come. Not only is 
there a huge year-to-year variability in ice conditions, but also multi-year ice 
can drift into the shipping lanes. Because it is thicker and harder than first-
year ice, multi-year ice will stop any ship except a high-powered ice-breaking 
vessel.35 In addition, there could be an increased number of icebergs, espe-
cially as the ice sheets and glaciers melt and break up. As a consequence, in the 
next few years, navigation in the Arctic is likely to be more, rather than less, 
dangerous. 
 Th e United States contends that the NWP is an international strait, open 
to use by all states, while Canada insists that the sea between the Canadian 
islands has the legal status of internal waters.36 Th is means that Canada enjoys 
full sovereignty and no foreign vessels may enter the strait without Canadian 
permission. Furthermore, if the NWP lies through internal waters, Canadian 
law would apply, including rules for environmental protection that could be 
stricter than international rules and standards. In 1970, Canada adopted the 
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act,37 giving it the power to apply special 
measures to protect the environment up 100 nm from the coast. Although the 
US protested the Act, during the negotiations for the LOSC, Canada, the US 
and the USSR (now succeeded by Russia) together worked on Article 234, 
which gives coastal states the jurisdiction to adopt special measures to protect 
the marine environment in ice-covered areas in the EEZ. However, such mea-
sures must have “due regard to navigation”. Exactly what this means is unclear. 
 Th e Canadian position on internal waters is based on a historic claim, as the 
Inuit have used the islands and the waters between them for millennia; on the 
rules for using straight baselines to enclose internal waters; and on the fact 
that very few ships have ever navigated through the strait.38 In the past 40 
years, only two vessels have transited the NWP without Canadian permission, 
a US-owned ice-strengthened tanker in 1969 and a US Coast Guard ice-
35  National Research Council Canada, “Safe Northern Passage”, January 2007, at http://www.
nrc-cnrc.gc.ca/highlights/2007/0701passage_e.html. For views of navigational experts, see 
Fairplay, 3 April 2008. 
36  See statement by the Legal Bureau of the Canadian Department of External Affairs made 
on 21 May 1987, reproduced in 25 Canadian Yearbook of International Law at 406 (1987). 
Most recently, the Canadian military has announced that henceforth, they will refer to the 
NWP as the “Canadian Internal Waters”, CanWest News Service, 9 April 2008, at http://
www.canada.com/. 
37  Statutes of Canada, Chap.47, 18-18 Eliz. II, 1969–70. 
38  For a thorough up-to-date analysis, see: D. Pharand, “Th e Arctic Waters and the Northwest 
Passage: A Final Revisit”, (2007) 38 Ocean Development and International Law 3–69. 
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breaker in 1985.39 Following the latter incident, Canada drew straight base-
lines around the Arctic islands, declaring the waters landward of the baselines 
to be internal waters.40 Th ese baselines conform to the requirements in Arti-
cles 7 and 8 of the LOSC, which allow coastal states to draw straight baselines 
around coasts that are deeply indented and fringed with islands, and to desig-
nate the sea area within as internal waters. 
 Th ere is also a Northern Sea Route (NSR or the Route) in the Arctic north 
of Russia extending from Novaya Zemlya in the west to the Bering Strait in the 
east. At present, the NSR is mainly traversed by local vessels supplying northern 
towns and servicing oil and gas installations. With longer ice-free periods, it 
could be used by ships on voyages from the Pacific to the North Sea and the 
Atlantic. It would also be convenient for tankers exporting oil and gas over 
longer distances. Th e Russian government officially opened up the NSR to for-
eign vessels in 1991 and from 1993–1999 participated in the International 
Northern Sea Route Programme (INSROP), an international, multidisciplinary 
research programme to create an extensive knowledge base about the ice-strewn 
shipping lanes north of the Russian mainland. One hundred and sixty-seven 
technical reports were produced and an international conference was held in 
1999.41 However, for a number of reasons, the route is not being used for 
through traffic even today. It is still dangerously infested with ice; some areas are 
shallow; the Russian authorities charge high rates for ice-breaking escorts and 
ice pilots; insurance rates are high; and the construction of large, ice-strength-
ened vessels would be prohibitively expensive. Nevertheless, in 2007, the Rus-
sian government appears to have decided to revive the Route.42 
 Th e United States has argued that both the NWP and the NSR are interna-
tional straits, passage through which is governed by Articles 34 to 45 in Part III 
of the LOSC. Briefly, these provisions grant the vessels of all states freedom 
of navigation and overflight without impediment, termed “transit passage” 
in “straits used for international navigation”. Coastal states enjoy much 
less control over passage through international straits than they do over pas-
sage through the territorial sea. In particular, to protect the environment in 
39  However, the first had a Canadian officer on board and was escorted by a Canadian ice-
breaker, while the second also had Canadians on board. See Pharand, op. cit., supra, note 38, 
for details of all transits up to 2005. 
40  Order in Council P.C. 1985–2739, adopted 10 September 1985, effective 1 January 1986. 
Th e statement of the Secretary of State for External Affairs is reproduced in 24 ILM 1723–27 
(1985). 
41  Reports and information available at: http://fni.no/insrop. 
42  See, for example: “Russia set to overhaul its Arctic fleet”, Russian News and Information 
Agency, 09/04/2007, at: http://en.rian.ru/analysis. 
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international straits, coastal states may only adopt and apply regulations “giv-
ing effect to applicable international regulations regarding the discharge of oil, 
oily wastes and other noxious substances”. Although Canada, Russia and the 
US have all adopted legislation and regulations for navigation through the 
Arctic, with Russia expressly relying on Article 234, the relationship between 
transit passage and Article 234 is unclear.43 
 Because of the increased melting of Arctic sea ice and an expectation of 
foreign vessels attempting to transit the NWP, in 2007, the Canadian Prime 
Minister announced a number of measures to “enhance” Canadian sover-
eignty in the Arctic, including the building of 6–8 naval patrol ships, a new 
military training facility and the development of Canada’s first Arctic deepwa-
ter port near Iqaluit.44 
 However, the real issue is the protection of the fragile Arctic environment 
from extensive shipping activity. Th ere are serious concerns that large num-
bers of ships transiting the Arctic straits might cause significant damage to the 
very sensitive environment, not only from oil spills, but also from operational 
pollution, the introduction of alien species and the disturbance of wildlife by 
movement, habitat fragmentation and noise. Th is threat would be even greater 
if the expectations of exploiting oil and gas deposits in the Arctic were realised, 
and the straits were extensively used by ships servicing a large number of 
offshore oil and gas installations, with the concomitant risks of operational 
and accidental pollution and constant disturbance. 
 Living Resources of the Sea 
 Fisheries are already being transformed, as certain species alter their distribu-
tion by moving north to seek food and colder water. Th e fisheries in the 
Barents and the Bering Seas, among the most productive in the world, are chang-
ing as commercial fishers follow the redistribution of the stocks. Th e IPCC 
considers that with an increase in open water, primary and secondary produc-
tion south of the ice edge will increase, benefiting almost all of the most 
43  See comparison and discussion by D. Brubaker, “Navigation and pollution in the Northern 
Sea Route”, in D. Vidas (ed.) Protecting the Polar Marine Environment, pp. 221–243 (Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000), as well as Pharand, op. cit., supra, note 38. 
44  See BBC News, “Canada ‘to reclaim Arctic waters”, at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go.pr.fr/-/hi/
americas/6287436.stm, dated 2007/07/10; “Canada to strengthen Arctic claim”, at <http://
news.bbc.co.uk/go.pr.fr/-/hi/americas/6941426.stm, dated 2007/08/10. 
 L.A. de La Fayette / Th e International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 23 (2008) 531–566 547
important commercial fish stocks in Arctic and sub-Arctic seas, such as cod 
and herring in the north Atlantic and walleye pollock in the Bering Sea.45 
 However, other species will not be able to survive a rise in temperature, 
different ocean depths, differences in algal blooms and plankton and other 
environmental changes such as ocean acidification and an influx of alien spe-
cies. For example, northern shrimp and king crab may lose habitat. Animals 
that live off organisms in the ice may starve because the ice is melting or form-
ing at different times. Others may proliferate because of a lack of predators. In 
addition, rising temperatures will lead to a risk of harmful algal blooms, 
marine pests and pollution, problems that will be exacerbated by an increase 
in shipping. As a consequence, some species may increase while others decrease, 
and the ecosystems will experience many changes that cannot be predicted. 
 Yet, the effect of a change in climate on future yields of commercial stocks 
may be less important than sound fisheries policies and their effective enforce-
ment. As fish cross international boundaries into new habitats, existing bilat-
eral and multilateral agreements for fisheries management and conservation 
may have to be amended and new arrangements entered into. Fisheries 
disputes between Norway and Russia around Svalbard46 have been exacer-
bated and conflicts have arisen between Russian and American fishermen in 
the Bering Sea.47 Although some existing fisheries agreements touch its fringes, 
there is no overall regional fisheries agreement for the Arctic. 
 Environmental and Social Consequences of Economic Development 
 Climate change alone is already having a significant impact on the entire Arc-
tic ecosystem through the physical alterations caused by higher temperatures 
on land and sea. Th e Arctic environment will also be affected by the increased 
economic development in the Arctic region expected to occur as a consequence 
of the melting of the sea ice and the permafrost. Th is includes not only 
mineral exploitation, fishing, shipping, tourism and bioprospecting, but also 
infrastructure development, such as new roads, ports, pipelines and towns, as 
45  Fourth Assessment Report, op. cit., supra, note 8, section 15.4.3, is the basis for most of this 
section. 
46  “Russia to protect its trawlers in Spitzbergen waters”, BarentsObserver, 2008-03-27, available 
at: www.barentsobserver.com/russia-to-protect-its-trawlers-in-spitsbergen-waters.4469904-16179.
html. 
47  “U.S. Coast Guard ramps up to patrol more-open Arctic waters”, presentation by Rear 
Admiral Arthur Brooks, commander of the 17th Coast Guard District, at the Alaska Business 
Roundtable on Climate Change, 14 February 2008, reported by the Alaska Star, 28 February 
2008, www.alaskastar.com/stories/022808/new_20080228006.shtml. 
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well as an influx of people from the south. While economic development may 
seem desirable, especially in depressed regions with few opportunities for 
employment, current and future changes will have a very high cost, in envi-
ronmental, human and financial terms. 
 Oil and Gas Development 
 Increased oil and gas development on land and new development offshore 
could have serious adverse environmental consequences, from accidental 
spills, operational pollution and general disturbance, during both the con-
struction and the operational phases of oil rigs.48 In the Arctic marine envi-
ronment, large oil spills are usually considered to be the greatest threat, because 
they are difficult, if not impossible to clean up, although smaller diffuse 
releases may also have a serious adverse impact. Because of the vulnerability of 
the fragile Arctic environment, the impact of a large oil spill could be severe 
for Arctic species and ecosystems. Research into the aftermath of the Exxon 
Valdez spill in Alaska in 1989 has shown that the deleterious effects of oil 
spills on marine organisms and ecosystems can last for decades.49 
 Environmental groups have condemned the sale in the pristine Chukchi 
Sea of oil and gas leases that open nearly 30 million acres of the sea to oil and 
gas exploitation. Th ey attempted to have polar bears listed as endangered spe-
cies in the hope that such a listing would impede oil and gas development in 
vulnerable areas, and complained about a long delay in listing, despite a 
finding by the US Geological Survey that two-thirds of the world’s polar bears, 
including all of Alaska’s bears, could disappear by 2050.50 Although the listing 
has now taken place, albeit after the sale of the oil and gas leases in the Chuk-
chi Sea, the current US government seems determined not to allow the listing 
to impede the development of energy resources.51 
48  “Arctic Oil and Gas 2007”, op. cit., supra, note 32. 
49  Ibid. 
50  “Arctic Oil Lease Sale Could Spell Disaster for Polar Bears, WWF says”, http://world-wire.
com/news/0802060002.html; “Feds seek more time for decision on listing polar bears”, Asso-
ciated Press (AP) 17 April 2008, www.auburnpub.com/articles/2008/04/17/ap/regional/us/
d9040utg3.txt; U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Alaska, http://alaska.fws.gov/; USGS Report: 
“Polar Bears in the Southern Beaufort Sea Ice: Survival and Breeding in Relation to Sea Ice 
Conditions, 2001–2006” by E. V. Regehr, C.M. Hunter, H. Caswell, S.C. Amstrup, and 
I. Stirling, at: http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/special/polar-bears/. 
51  Environmental News Service, “U.S. Lists Polar Bear as Th reatened But Balks at New Pro-
tection”, May 14, 2008, at: http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/may2008/2008-05-14-10.asp. 
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 Recently, Russian scientists have expressed concern about the environmen-
tal effects of exploiting the mineral resources of the continental shelf. A Rus-
sian news report in May 2008 stated that the Arctic has huge hydrocarbon 
reserves and that shallow shelf seas occupy 30% of the Arctic, 70% of which 
belongs to Russia. Russian experts maintain that the reserves of gas hydrates 
and condensates in the eastern Arctic shelves are comparable to their entire 
resources on land. Yet, it would be difficult to exploit them, as this would 
require huge investment, and entirely new technical potential, and innovative 
methods. Scientists are seriously worried about the negative consequences of 
economic activity on the shelves. For example, Professor Mikhail Flint, Dep-
uty Director of the Institute of Oceanology, has said that: 
 Th e life of the ecosystems in the Arctic is short—from two to two and a half 
months. Unregulated navigation, active construction, and irrational mining may 
turn these sensitive systems into a heap of waste, which will be very hard to clean 
up. Any intervention into these systems is dangerous. A good example is the 
imprints left by SUVs in the tundra; they do not disappear for decades. Heat 
exchange starts in the grooves, which exerts a negative influence on the perma-
frost. Th e same may happen in the sea.52  
 Ships and Shipping 
 As noted above, the environmental consequences of increased commercial 
shipping in the Arctic could also be quite serious, not only from accidental oil 
spills, but also from increased pollution caused by operational discharges of 
oils and chemicals. Arctic ecosystems will be affected by pollution, noise, alien 
species, ships colliding with marine mammals, habitat fragmentation, and 
general disturbance, including of feeding and breeding areas. Problems would 
be caused by ships involved in oil and gas exploration and exploitation, includ-
ing tankers, as well as by general cargo vessels, naval vessels, fishing vessels, 
tourist cruise ships, and even scientific research vessels. Despite the serious-
ness of rare catastrophic oil spills, chronic low-level pollution over many 
years from all kinds of ships poses the greatest threat to the environment and 
may affect all ecosystems within a given area. Contaminants accumulate in 
the body fat of Arctic organisms because they have evolved to store food 
for use in their bodies when none is available in the frozen environment. 
52  Novosti (Russian News and Information Agency), “Th e Arctic—melting ice reveals mineral 
wealth”, 01/05/2008, at: http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080501/106332122. 
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Th ese contaminants are then passed up through the food chain, even to human 
beings.53 
 Tourism has increased dramatically in the Arctic, because of increased 
awareness of its beauty and grandeur and also because of a desire to see it 
before the ice melts and the animals disappear. However, excessive tourism 
could cause environmental damage, both from the usual problems caused by 
an increasing number of vessels and because waste from garbage and sewage 
would have to be disposed of.54 More generally, as noted above, even if all the 
new single-year sea ice melts, navigation in the Arctic could remain hazardous 
for some time to come, as multi-year ice will linger and so will icebergs, in 
particular those calving off melting glaciers. Th is could result in more acci-
dents, causing further problems, including pollution by leaking heavy fuel oil 
from cruise ships.55  
 Fishing 
 In addition to problems caused by an increasing number of fishing vessels, 
uncontrolled fishing could bring other forms of damage in its wake, such as 
over-fishing; excessive by-catch, especially of sea birds; marine debris from 
discarded nets; habitat destruction; and various destructive fishing practices, 
such as bottom trawling. Fishing is considered to be possibly the greatest 
threat to the marine environment and marine biodiversity. 
 Marine Scientific Research and Bioprospecting 
 Although marine scientific research is essential for understanding marine eco-
systems and for devising ways to protect the marine environment and marine 
biodiversity, scientific research is not always entirely benign and care must be 
taken not to damage the marine environment in the course of scientific inves-
53  See, for example, K. A. Moe, “NSR activities—Environmental assessments”, in papers of 
the Northern Sea Route User Conference, at: http://www.fni.no/insrop/execsum.htm. 
54  Th e US Environmental Protection Agency recently published a Draft Cruise Ship Dis-
charge Assessment Report regarding ships operating in Alaska that found ships routinely dis-
charge massive amounts of poorly treated sewage and highly contaminated raw grey water into 
harbours and coastal waters, available at: http://www.epa.gov/owow/oceans/cruise_ships/disch_
assess_draft.html. 
55  Th e parties to the Antarctic Treaty have asked the International Maritime Organization to 
prohibit ships operating in the Antarctic area from using heavy fuel oil, IMO DOC MEPC 
57/21. 
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tigations. In addition, there are a number of problems associated with bio-
prospecting in extreme environments. Investigations with a commercial purpose 
should be controlled to ensure they do not harm the organisms they are tar-
geting or the supporting ecosystem.56  
Consequences of Arctic Climate Change
 In conclusion, the consequences for the Arctic of climate change per se could 
range from disturbing to devastating. Various feedback effects are exacerbat-
ing already unprecedented rapid change, with uncertain short- and long-term 
consequences. Furthermore, the prospects of economic development brought 
on by warmer temperatures and the melting of ice and permafrost, while wel-
come in many ways, could prove to be immensely destructive of fragile Arctic 
ecosystems and social systems, if not subjected to rigorous planning and con-
trol. Economic development must be carefully planned and controlled in 
order to be environmentally sustainable. 
 How is this to be achieved? Th e first step should be to investigate more thor-
oughly the current situation in the Arctic, to try to assess future developments, 
and to conduct environmental impact assessments as the basis for action. Th is 
means more intensive scientific research. As governments and scientists are 
becoming more aware of the enormity of the problems in the Arctic, this 
enhanced research is already taking place. Since all the states in the Arctic 
share the same or a similar environment and similar problems, the second step 
would be to elaborate collectively a sustainable development plan on the basis 
56  For a more detailed discussion of marine biodiversity and bioprospecting beyond national 
jurisdiction, see several reports by the United Nations, at: http:// www.un.org/Depts/los: 
Reports of the Secretary-General on Oceans and the law of the sea, 2003–2007, with areas of 
focus for the United Nations Informal Open-ended Consultative Process on Oceans and the 
Law of the Sea (ICP): “Protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems”, A/58/95, 2003; “New, 
sustainable uses of the oceans, including the conservation and management of the biological 
diversity of the seabed in areas beyond national jurisdiction”, A/59/122, 2004; A/60/99, 
2005;“Ecosystems and oceans”, A/61/156, 2006; “Marine Genetic Resources”, A/62/66, 
2007; Report of ICP-8, A/62/169, 2007; Report for the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-
ended Informal Working Group to study issues relating to the conservation and sustainable 
use of marine biological diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction, A/60/63/Add.1, 2005; 
Report for the second meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to study 
issues relating to the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond 
areas of national jurisdiction, A/62/66/Add.2, 2007; and by the same author, “A New Regime 
for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biodiversity and Genetic Resources 
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction”, International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 
forthcoming. 
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of scientific assessments. Th e third step would then be to adopt decisions to 
implement the plan in a cooperative manner. To a certain extent, the first two 
steps have already been taken. 
 Scientific Research in the Arctic 
 Scientific research is essential for understanding and mitigating environmen-
tal change and degradation in the Arctic. In recent years, mounting concern 
and interest in rapid climate change in the Arctic has prompted intensified 
scientific research. In 2000, the Arctic Council commissioned a study of cli-
mate change in the Arctic, released in 2004 as the Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment (ACIA). An important aspect of the study was an examination of 
the impact of climate on people in the Arctic. Other studies have followed. 
Th e Arctic Council has on-going programmes of monitoring, research and 
assessment of activities in the Arctic adversely affecting the environment and 
the inhabitants, including studies relating to climate change, acidification in 
the Arctic Ocean, Arctic haze, ultraviolet radiation, radioactivity, persistent 
organic pollutants, biodiversity, shipping, oil and gas, ecosystem-based man-
agement, environment and health, sustainable development, etc.57 Th e Arctic 
Council is also involved in the International Polar Year (see below). 
 In April 2007, the IPCC issued its Fourth Report. Its Working Group II 
described some of the consequences of climate change in the Arctic and pre-
dicted further changes in the future. Th e IPCC explicitly relied on the ACIA 
for much of its assessment. It is important to note that the IPCC was examin-
ing the results of research that has to a certain extent been overtaken by sub-
sequent discoveries. Further scientific research and observations published 
since the launch of the Fourth IPCC Report have shown that the Arctic cli-
mate is changing more rapidly than expected. At the same time, the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) was working on a report on the 
status of ice and snow on a world-wide basis, containing material on the Arc-
tic that was more up to date. Th is report, the Global Outlook for Ice and Snow,58 
was launched at UNEP’s annual celebration of International Environment 
Day in June 2007 with the theme “Melting Ice—A Hot Topic”.59 UNEP’s 
Global Outlook was compiled in part to support the International Polar Year. 
 Just prior to the release of the IPCC report, the International Polar Year 
(IPY) was launched in Paris. In this major initiative of the World Meteoro-
57  See reports on Arctic Portal website, at http://www.arcticportal.org/en/arctic-council2. 
58  Available at http://www.unep.org/geo/geo_ice. 
59  For information see www.unep.org/wed/2007 and <http://www.wed.npolar.no>. 
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logical Organisation and Th e International Council for Science, thousands 
of scientists from over 60 countries are collaborating from March 2007 to 
March 2009 in a wide range of scientific research programmes covering both 
the Arctic and the Antarctic. Th ey will take a full two years to investigate 
scientific questions through the seasons at both poles and in some cases will 
make comparisons between the situations at the north and the south poles. 
Fifty years ago, a similar international research programme, the International 
Geophysical Year 1957–58, led to the elaboration of the Antarctic Treaty, 
adopted in 1959, which established an international legal regime for the Ant-
arctic, preserving it as a peaceful continent where sovereignty claims were 
frozen and dedicating it to international cooperation and scientific explora-
tion (see further below). 
 A New Regime for the Arctic 
 A number of commentators have suggested that an agreement similar to the 
Antarctic Treaty be elaborated in order to establish a legally binding regime 
for the Arctic, focussing on the protection of the environment and the sus-
tainable exploitation of the natural resources of the region.60 Others consider 
that existing instruments suffice or that a legally binding agreement would be 
difficult to conclude.61 Certainly, up to the present there has been strong resis-
tance to such proposals, in particular from the United States, and now, pos-
sibly from Denmark (see above). Th is could be, at least, in part, due to 
sovereignty concerns, including a wish to maintain cooperation with respect 
to land-based activities on a strictly voluntary basis. Moreover, it is highly 
unlikely that the Arctic states would be willing to give up or “freeze” their 
sovereignty, to refrain from resource exploitation, and to “internationalise” 
the area, turning it into a marine park or marine protected area, similar to the 
60  For example, see discussions of various proposals in: T. Koivurova and D. Vanderzwaag, 
“Th e Arctic Council at 10 Years: Retrospect and Prospects”, (2007) 40 U.B.C. Law Review 
121; T. Koivurova, “Alternatives for an Arctic Treaty—Evaluation and a New Proposal”, 
(2008) 17 RECIEL 14–26, R. Rayfuse, “Melting Moments”, (2007) 16 RECIEL 196–216 and 
“Protecting Marine Biodiversity in Polar Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction”, (2008) 17 
RECIEL 3–13. Two other proposals are somewhat confused from a legal point of view: WWF, 
“a new sea”, (2007), available at: http://www.panda.org/arctic/; and B.G. Sobel, I. Smith and 
A. Rosencranz, “Th e Melting and Partitioning of a Global Commons”, (2007) 37/6 Environ-
mental Policy and Law 467–470. 
61  For example, H. Corell, “Reflections on the Possibilities and Limitations of a Binding Legal 
Regime for the Arctic”, (2007) 37/4 Environmental Policy and Law 321–324. 
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Antarctic continental regime. Perhaps more surprisingly, states have also been 
unwilling to enter into a binding agreement on protection of the marine envi-
ronment in the Arctic. However, because of recent events and the drastic 
alterations in the Arctic environment, attitudes may begin to change. 
 In its press release commenting on the findings of the IPCC on the impact 
of climate change in the Arctic, UNEP called for a sustainable development 
plan for the region.62 Th us, there are two parallel proposals to ensure the sus-
tainable development of the Arctic: a comprehensive convention or a sustain-
able development plan. Which would be more effective, and which would be 
more feasible? In which forum would these instruments be negotiated and 
who would participate? How would this relate to the Arctic Council? In fact, 
the two proposals are not necessarily opposed, but could be combined, by 
negotiating a sustainable development plan within the context of a binding 
legal regime. Furthermore, a basis for a detailed and up-to-date sustainable 
development plan has already been elaborated in the form of the Arctic Marine 
Strategic Plan,63 together with a number of other plans and assessments 
adopted by the Arctic Council. 
 Th e Existing Regime in the Arctic 
 Although there is no overall international legal regime governing the Arctic, a 
number of international treaties apply, in particular the LOSC, which, as 
stated above, provides rules concerning maritime boundaries, claims to an 
outer continental shelf, sovereign rights over resources, and the protection of 
the marine environment. All the Arctic states are parties to the LOSC, except 
the United States, whose Senate is currently contemplating accession. 
 Other relevant global conventions include: the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD), a broad range of conventions and other instruments adopted by the 
International Maritime Organization, the London (Dumping) Convention 
1972 and its 1996 Protocol, the Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species (CITES), the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants (POPs), and the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International 
62  UNEP, “Adaptation to Climate Change Key Challenge for Arctic Peoples and Arctic Econ-
omy: Th awing Permafrost, Melting Sea Ice and Significant Changes in Natural Resources 
Demands Comprehensive Sustainable Development Plan”, press release 10 April 2007, http://
www.unep.org. 
63  Adopted 24 November 2004, available at: http://arcticportal.org/pame/amsp. 
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Importance. Non-binding instruments include the Declaration of Principles 
and Agenda 21 adopted by the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development and the Global Programme of Action for the Protec-
tion of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities, as well as the 
2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development and its Johannesburg Plan 
of Implementation.64 
 Some regional conventions are also relevant, including the Convention on 
the Protection of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR) and the Convention on 
Future Multilateral Co-operation in the North East Atlantic Fisheries 
(NEAFC), both of which extend to a certain extent into the Arctic region. As 
noted above, cooperation for the protection of the Arctic environment is 
undertaken within the Arctic Council. 
 While the LOSC establishes the rules concerning the division of ocean 
space, activities on and under the high seas, sovereign rights over resources, 
and jurisdiction over marine scientific research and protection of the environ-
ment, in many cases, in particular in relation to fisheries and environmental 
protection, these provisions are expressed at the level of general principles. In 
such cases, the Convention requires states to adopt, keep under review and 
revise global and regional agreements concerning international fisheries and 
the protection of the marine environment. 
 With respect to international fisheries, Articles 63 and 64 require states to 
cooperate in the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and 
highly migratory fish stocks, and to establish regional fisheries organisations 
to this end.65 Articles 116–119 on fisheries on the high seas require states to 
cooperate for the conservation and management of high seas fisheries and to 
establish subregional or regional fisheries organisations, if appropriate. A con-
siderable number of international agreements have been adopted to imple-
ment these provisions at both the regional and the global levels. At the global 
level, instruments include the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, and several instru-
ments adopted under the auspices of the Food and Agricultural Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO), including: the Agreement to Promote Compli-
ance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing 
Vessels on the High Seas (FAO Compliance Agreement) and the FAO Code 
of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. (See below for more information.) 
 In Part XII on the Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, 
Articles 192 to 237 require states to protect the marine environment, rare and 
64  See also list compiled for the seminar on Multilateral Environmental Agreements and their 
relevance to the Arctic, held 21–22 September 2006, Arendal, Norway: http://polar.grida.
no/activities.cfm?pageID=5. 
65  If appropriate under Article 63, and mandatory under Article 64. 
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fragile species and habitats and to adopt multilateral agreements to address 
specific issues of marine degradation. Section 1 enunciates general principles; 
section 2 mandates global and regional cooperation; section 3 provides for 
technical assistance to developing countries; section 4 requires monitoring 
and environmental assessment; section 5 requires states to adopt international 
and national legislation to protect the marine environment from degradation 
from all sources; section 6 covers enforcement; section 7, safeguards and sec-
tion 8, ice-covered areas. Included in these provisions are requirements for 
notification of imminent or actual damage, joint contingency plans by states 
in an area, scientific studies and research programmes, monitoring of risks 
of environmental damage, publication of reports and environmental impact 
assessments. 
 Article 197 requires states to cooperate on a global and, as appropriate on a 
regional basis, to elaborate international rules, standards and recommended 
practices and procedures for the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment, taking into account characteristic regional features. Part IX of 
the LOSC, comprising Articles 122 and 123, requires states surrounding 
enclosed or semi-enclosed seas to: 
1)  cooperate with each other in the management, conservation, explora-
tion and exploitation of the living resources of the sea, 
 2)  coordinate their work on the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment, 
 3)  coordinate their scientific research policies and undertake joint pro-
grammes of research, and 
 4)  invite other states to cooperate with them in furtherance of the provi-
sions of the article. 
 Furthermore, Article 234 on ice-covered areas recognises the need for coastal 
states to take special measures to protect the environment in ice-covered areas. 
Taken together, these provisions seem to be a mandate for regional coopera-
tion on marine issues in the Arctic, not only on an ad hoc voluntary basis, as 
with the Arctic Council, but also in the form of a binding regional agreement. 
 Regional Seas and Fisheries Agreements and the Antarctic Treaty as 
Models 
 Many precedents and models already exist for an Arctic regional agreement 
dealing with marine issues, in the form of regional seas agreements and 
regional fisheries agreements. 
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 Regional Seas Agreements 
 In order to implement Part XII of the LOSC at the regional level, states have 
concluded 18 regional seas agreements and/or action plans.66 More than 140 
countries participate in 13 Regional Seas programmes established under the 
auspices of UNEP: the Black Sea, Wider Caribbean, East Africa, South East 
Asia, ROPME Sea Area, Mediterranean, North-East Pacific, North-West Pacific, 
Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, South Asia, South-East Pacific, Pacific, and West 
and Central Africa. Furthermore, there are independent programmes for the 
Antarctic, Baltic Sea, Caspian Sea and North-East Atlantic Regions. Most 
regional agreements have annexes or protocols dealing with the various aspects 
of protection of the environment called for in Part XII of the LOSC and some 
have adopted an ecosystem approach to managing human activities and to the 
protection of biodiversity and the marine environment. 
 Perhaps the most relevant regional instrument and one to provide inspira-
tion for a future Arctic regime is the Convention for the Protection of the 
Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention).67 
Furthermore, because the geographic scope of OSPAR extends into the Arc-
tic, cooperation with a new Arctic regime would be essential. Th e OSPAR 
66  See website for the regional seas at: http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/ for more informa-
tion and links to the texts of convention sites. Th e conventions are: Convention for the Protec-
tion of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean (Barcelona 
Convention); Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment 
of the Wider Caribbean Region; Convention for the Protection, Management and Develop-
ment of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Region; Convention 
for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment 
of the West and Central African Region; Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea 
Against Pollution; Convention for Cooperation in the Protection and Sustainable Develop-
ment of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Northeast Pacific; Regional Convention 
for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment; Kuwait Regional 
Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution; 
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Areas of the South-
East Pacific; Convention for the Protection of Natural Resources and Environment of the 
South Pacific Region; Antarctic Treaty, Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic 
Treaty, Th e Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources; Convention 
on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (Helsinki Convention); 
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR 
Convention). 
67  Th e Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic 
(Paris), 22 September 1992, 21 International Legal Materials 1068 (1993); see website at: 
http://www.ospar.org for more information, and for background see: L. de La Fayette, “Th e 
OSPAR Convention Comes into Force: Continuity and Progress”, (1999) 14 International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 247–297. 
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Convention is one of the most developed of the regional seas conventions, 
with a main convention containing general obligations and principles and five 
annexes covering: 1) the prevention and elimination of pollution from land-
based sources, 2) the prevention and elimination of pollution by dumping 
and incineration, 3) the prevention and elimination of pollution from offshore 
sources, 4) the assessment of the marine environment, and 5) the protection 
and conservation of ecosystems and biological diversity of the maritime area. 
Implementation of the OSPAR Convention is carried out by the OSPAR 
Commission and several subsidiary groups working in accordance with the 
ecosystem approach. OSPAR has adopted six strategies on the following sub-
jects: protection and conservation of marine biodiversity and ecosystems, 
eutrophication, hazardous substances, offshore oil and gas industry, radioac-
tive substances and monitoring and assessment. OSPAR has had joint meet-
ings to discuss issues of mutual concern with NEAFC and the Helsinki 
Commission, which implements the Convention on the Protection of the 
Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area.68 
 While the work of OSPAR could provide a model for a new Arctic regime 
to a certain extent, it does not cover navigation or fisheries, and the management 
of both is essential for the application of an integrated ecosystem approach. 
 International Fisheries 
 Th e LOSC, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA)69 and the FAO Code of 
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries70 all provide for the conservation and man-
agement of international fisheries through regional fisheries agreements and 
arrangements and regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs).71 
Th e UNFSA, which was designed to provide more detail for the implementa-
68  Done at Helsinki, 9 April 1992, 2099 UNTS 197. For text of the Helsinki Convention and 
information about measures taken by the Helsinki Commission, see website at: http://www.
helcom.fi. 
69  Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, signed 4 December 1995, in force 11 December 2001, 34 
ILM 1542 (1995). Information and text at: www.un.org/Depts/los. 
70  For texts of the UNFSA, the FAO Compliance Agreement and the FAO Code of Conduct, 
see: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, International Fisheries Instru-
ments with Index, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United Nations, New 
York, 1998. FAO instruments are also available online at: http://www.fao.org/fi. 
71  For a list and description of regional fisheries bodies, see the website of the FAO Fisheries 
Division, at: http://www.fao.org/fi. 
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tion of Articles 63 and 64 of the LOSC, relies on regional fisheries agreements 
for its implementation and provides considerable guidance for their establish-
ment and functioning. Th ese address either particular species, such as tuna, or 
all fisheries within a specific region. Th e United Nations General Assembly 
has urged states to establish new RFMOs where none exist and to expand the 
competence of existing RFMOs to apply the ecosystem and precautionary 
approaches and to protect biodiversity from destructive fishing practices.72 
Th e regulatory area of NEAFC extends to a certain extent into the Arctic73 
and the North Atlantic Salmon Organisation (NASCO)74 applies to salmon 
migrating into the Arctic; however, there is no regional fisheries agreement 
covering the entire Arctic Ocean. Up until now, this has not been a problem 
because there has not been extensive fishing in the central Arctic Ocean, but 
with some fish stocks moving north, cooperation in conservation and man-
agement of fisheries will be required. 
 Th e Antarctic Treaty System 
 Th e Antarctic Treaty system, comprising several instruments (see below), could 
provide some inspiration for an Arctic regime, at least on the level of general 
principles and issues covered. However, the geographical and political situa-
tion in the Antarctic is very different from its northern counterpart and the 
system has grown in an ad hoc manner over the years. Geographically, the 
Arctic is the exact opposite of the Antarctic, which is a large body of ice-
covered land surrounded by sea. Although sovereignty over most of the Ant-
arctic land territory is claimed by several states, these claims have not been 
universally recognised and have been “frozen” by the Antarctic Treaty, which 
established a legal regime for the area, including the surrounding waters, 
up to 60˚S. Other differences with the Arctic are the lack of a permanent 
indigenous population in Antarctica and a ban on the exploitation of mineral 
resources in the 1991 Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection. Th e 
legal situation regarding claims to the outer limits of the continental shelf is 
unclear. 
72  UNGA Resolution 62/177, adopted on 18 December 2007; see also paras. 5, 82, 85, and 
93; available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los. 
73  See NEAFC website at: http://www.neafc.org. Th ere is also a “bilateralist” regime in the 
Barents Sea. See O.S. Stokke, “Th e Loophole of the Barents Sea Fisheries Regime”, in 
O.S. Stokke (ed.) Governing High Seas Fisheries: Th e Interplay of Global and Regional Regimes, 
Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 273–301. 
74  See NASCO website at: http://www.nasco.int. 
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 Th e Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) includes: the Antarctic Treaty, 1959;75 
the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, London, 1972 
(CCAS); the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources, Canberra, 1980 (CCAMLR);76 and the Protocol on Environmen-
tal Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Madrid, 1991.77 Th e Treaty provides 
that Antarctica is to be used for peaceful purposes only and that its main pur-
pose is to facilitate scientific research. Th e underlying principles of the entire 
regime are cooperation among the parties for: the governance of Antarctica, 
protection of the environment, conservation of natural resources and scientific 
research. A large number of Measures and Decisions adopted by the parties at 
their biennial, and later annual, meetings aim to protect the environment, 
including the marine environment of the Antarctic area. Recent issues that 
have assumed increasing importance over the years are the threat posed by 
excessive tourism and the question of whether and how to regulate bio-
prospecting for genetic resources. 
 Ideas that might be taken from the ATS for a new Arctic regime are: the 
importance of scientific research, the need to conserve natural resources, the 
principles of environmental protection in the Madrid Protocol, and the eco-
system approach, first incorporated in treaty form in CCAMLR. Although 
mainly a regional fisheries agreement, CCAMLR also has a mandate to pro-
tect the entire Southern (Antarctic) Ocean ecosystem. Although legally sepa-
rate, CCAMLR participates in the ATS and parties to the Madrid Protocol are 
bound to respect its provisions. 
 Th e Arctic Council 
 Th e Arctic Council was established in 1996 by the Ottawa Declaration as a 
forum for discussion and cooperation among the eight Arctic States, with the 
participation of six associations of indigenous peoples (Permanent Partici-
pants). It is not an international organisation and does not have the power to 
75  Done at Washington, 1 December 1959; in force 23 June 1961; 402 UNTS 71 165. 
76  Done at Canberra, 20 May 1980; in force 1982, 19 I.L.M. 841. For text and comprehen-
sive information, see website of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources, at http://www.ccamlr.org. 
77  Protocol on Environmental Protection, Madrid, 4 October 1991; in force 14 January 1998; 
30 ILM 1461 (1991) 335, 343, 358. For a recent reappraisal of the Antarctic Treaty System, 
see: G. Triggs and A. Riddell, (eds.) Future Challenges for the Antarctic Treaty Regime, British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, London, 2007. Th e book includes the texts 
of all the ATS instruments in an annex. 
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adopt legally binding decisions. Its main concerns are to protect the environ-
ment and the interests of native people and to assess possibilities for sustain-
able development. Ministerial meetings are held every two years in the country 
holding the rotating chairmanship. Th ere is no permanent secretariat. Th ere 
are six Working Groups: Arctic Contaminants Action Plan (ACAP), the Arctic 
Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Conservation of Arctic 
Flora and Fauna (CAFF), Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response 
(EPPR), Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), and Sustain-
able Development Working Group (SDWG). 
 As noted above, the Arctic Council commissioned ACIA, the landmark 
study of the effects of climate change in the Arctic, and has followed it up with 
a number of other assessments, including those on oil and gas, biodiversity 
and shipping. Th e Council has also adopted several action plans and guide-
lines. A number of scientific research programmes are underway and the 
Council collaborates to a certain extent with other organisations. However, 
the work is fragmented and hampered by the lack of funding, of a firm legal 
structure and of a permanent secretariat. As a “soft law” institution producing 
assessments and recommendations, the Council lacks force, as well as an effective 
integrated structure. Norway, Denmark and Sweden have taken some steps 
towards improving coherence by agreeing on common objectives for their suc-
cessive chairmanships, as well as a common secretariat from 2006 to 2012.78 
 In addition to a lack of solid structure, a secretariat and dependable fund-
ing, the Arctic Council suffers from some substantive limitations. First, the 
Council does not address fisheries issues, which is a serious lacuna when deal-
ing with environmental protection and biodiversity conservation, since fishing 
is one of the greatest threats to both. Second, while the Arctic Council is con-
ducting a shipping assessment, it does not have the authority to adopt legally 
binding shipping regulations. Such regulations, which could bind all states 
that become parties to the relevant treaties, are established by the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization (IMO). If Arctic states wish to have new ship-
ping regulations to protect the Arctic environment, they must submit a 
proposal to IMO. Th ird, the Arctic Council does not have a follow-up or 
compliance mechanism to determine whether plans are being implemented or 
guidelines are being followed.79  
78  See website for further information: www.arctic-council.org. 
79  See article by T. Koivurova and D. Vanderzwaag, “Th e Arctic Council at 10 Years: 
Retrospect and Prospects”, op. cit., supra, at note 60 for a review and critique of the Council’s 
functioning. 
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 Navigation and the International Maritime Organization 
 IMO, the UN specialised agency dealing with international shipping activi-
ties, has adopted over 40 instruments addressing shipping safety and security 
and the protection of the marine environment.80 Shipping regulations have to 
be adopted at the international level in order to be uniform in all oceans and 
seas and binding on all states and their ships. However, measures to protect 
the marine environment are more stringent in areas that require special pro-
tection due to the sensitivity of the marine environment and the nature and 
amount of shipping. Such protection is afforded by Special Areas under the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MAR-
POL) and through the Guidelines for Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSAs).81 
Th e Antarctic marine area, the Baltic Sea, the seas off Northwest Europe and 
several other seas are Special Areas, and a number of PSSAs have been desig-
nated around the world.82 
 In December 2002, IMO adopted the Guidelines for Ships Operating in 
Arctic Ice-Covered Waters,83 which are currently being updated and expanded 
to include the waters around Antarctica. Although focused on ship construc-
tion and safety issues, the Guidelines should help to protect the environment 
by preventing accidents that could have adverse environmental consequences. 
On 4 April 2008, IMO decided to initiate work on guidance for Oil Spill 
Response in Ice and Snow Conditions, as proposed by the United States.84  
 Protection of Marine Biodiversity 
 Marine biodiversity in the Arctic is severely threatened by climate change and 
by the increase in human activities that change might bring. While Arctic 
80  See IMO website for further information, including summaries of instruments and meet-
ings: http://www.imo.org. IMO documents are confidential and not available to the public 
online, except for circulars. 
81  For information of the work of IMO regarding protection of the marine environment, see: 
L. de La Fayette, “Th e Marine Environment Protection Committee: Conjunction of the Law 
of the Sea and International Environmental Law”, (2001) 16 International Journal of Marine 
and Coastal Law 163–234, and a comprehensive review prepared by the IMO secretariat in 
2007 to celebrate the work of IMO in this field, “IMO’s response to current environmental 
challenges”, (2007) IMO News, Issue 2, pp. 14–29. 
82  IMO Doc MEPC 57/7/1 and Corr.1 contains a list of PSSAs adopted up to April 2008. 
83  IMO circular MSC/Circ.1056—MEPC/Circ.399, often erroneously referred to as “Th e 
Polar Code”, available on IMO website, op. cit., supra, note 79. 
84  IMO Docs MEPC 57/6 and MEPC 57/WP.10 (report of the Marine Environment Protec-
tion Committee on its 57th session, April 2008). 
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states have the jurisdiction to protect marine organisms within their territorial 
seas, EEZs and on their continental shelves, there is no global or regional 
agreement specifically addressing the protection and sustainable use of marine 
biodiversity beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Th e issue of marine 
biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction is currently being discussed at the 
United Nations, in the context of the CBD, and within some regional agree-
ments. Until now, there has not been much human activity in the central 
Arctic Ocean to pose a threat to any animals in the area. However, with the 
melting ice, such as navigation and fisheries, if not mineral exploitation, might 
begin to move beyond areas beyond coastal state jurisdiction and some means 
will have to be found to protect biodiversity in the ocean. Any such measures 
should be consistent with any principles, rules, measures or instruments 
adopted by the UN General Assembly.85  
 An Integrated, Ecosystem Approach in a New Agreement for the Arctic 
 With the accelerated melting of sea ice and glaciers in the past two years, the 
Arctic marine environment has reached a crisis point. It is now time to recon-
sider strengthening oceans governance in the Arctic by the adoption of a 
regional seas agreement and by the establishment of a fully-fledged interna-
tional organisation to address marine environmental issues of common con-
cern. Th e agreement and the organisation could follow the models provided 
by the existing agreements, setting out the purpose of protection of the marine 
environment, biodiversity and living marine resources, and outlining general 
principles and basic obligations, with protocols or annexes dealing with the 
various issues contained in Part XII of the LOSC and the regional seas agree-
ments. Th e Arctic regional sea agreement should cover the EEZs of the Arctic 
coastal states as well as the high seas of the central Arctic Ocean. 
 Th e new agreement could be negotiated within the context of the Arctic 
Council and could assume its responsibilities, its working groups, and its 
members. Like the other regional agreements, it would have a permanent 
secretariat and a permanent budget and be able to adopt binding decisions as 
85  See discussion in de La Fayette, “A New Regime for the Conservation and Sustainable Use 
of Marine Biodiversity and Genetic Resources Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction”, 
IJMCL 2009, forthcoming, and reports by the United Nations cited therein, as well as the 
reports by the Earth Negotiations Bulletin of the most recent (April–May 2008) meeting of 
the United Nations Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to study issues relating to 
the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond areas of national 
jurisdiction, at http://www.iisd.org. 
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well as recommendations and resolutions. Bringing all the issues together 
within a structured legally binding framework would facilitate the elaboration 
of an overall plan for sustainable development and would help to ensure its 
implementation. However, in order to provide for an integrated, ecosystem 
approach to oceans management, it is essential that, unlike the other agree-
ments, the conservation and management of fisheries be included in the Arc-
tic agreement. Th e Arctic Organisation should be able to oversee and to 
manage in an integrated fashion all activities and all potential sources of envi-
ronmental degradation within the region.86 One signal weakness of the regimes 
in other regions is that protection of the marine environment and fisheries are 
dealt with by different organisations. Th is makes the protection of marine 
biodiversity and the ecosystem approach to oceans management difficult, if 
not impossible to apply. 
 Recognising this problem, the UN General Assembly has repeatedly urged 
regional seas organisations and regional fisheries bodies to cooperate. In 
practice, however, such cooperation is difficult to implement once separate 
organisations have been established, as they tend to jealously guard their inde-
pendence. Much better, therefore, to address all the relevant issues within one 
organisation, with, of course, the exception of shipping regulations, as ships 
from all over the world may operate in the Arctic region and the same rules 
must apply to all. However, the Arctic states could apply to IMO to adopt 
additional measures to protect the Arctic from an expected increase in ship-
ping activities, besides the existing “Guidelines”, which focus on shipping 
safety. Th ese additional environmental measures could include the designa-
tion of the entire Arctic Ocean as a Special Area under MARPOL, the cre-
ation of PSSAs in certain areas, and the adoption of other measures to address 
problems such as those identified in the Antarctic in a document submitted to 
IMO by non-governmental organisations (NGOs).87 
 Th e measures adopted by IMO could then be confirmed and guidelines 
could even be made legally binding through Decisions taken by the members 
of the Arctic Ocean Organisation or in an annex or protocol devoted to ship-
ping (see the Helsinki Convention and the Madrid Protocol for models). Th is 
type of procedure could side-step sovereignty issues relating to passage through 
the NWP and the NSR. Even if Canada and Russia consider the sea areas in 
question to be internal waters, they could obtain the environmental protec-
tion they wish by working together with other states at IMO and in the con-
86  Many of the sources of environmental degradation lie outside the Arctic. Th ese include 
climate change, ozone depletion, and the discharge of persistent organic pollutants. 
87  IMO Doc. MEPC 57/INF. 19. 
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text of a new Arctic Ocean Organisation. It might be noted here that the 
Arctic Council shipping assessment is being led by Canada, Finland and the 
US, while the revision of the IMO Guidelines for Arctic ice-covered areas is 
being coordinated by Canada. Measures adopted at IMO are usually adopted 
by consensus and are applicable to the ships of all states. 
 More generally, it should be noted that there is already a considerable 
amount of cooperation in the Arctic. Th e vision of military conflict or a battle 
for territory and resources is wholly imaginary. States have agreed many of 
their boundaries and are working on the rest. Canada and Denmark will dis-
cuss sovereignty over Hans Island, but they are already collaborating on 
scientific projects, including on the island and on surveying the outer limits 
of the continental shelf. Canada has also suggested cooperation with Russia 
and the US on continental shelf surveys. Russia has agreed to let the CLCS go 
ahead with consideration of the Norwegian claim. Th e question of navigation 
through the NWP was stabilised, if not settled, by Canada and the US in a 
compromise agreement in 1988.88 In any event, some commentators believe 
that because of security concerns, the US is now more willing to have the 
NWP completely under Canadian control. Th at would be preferable to hav-
ing it freely open to all comers. Th e existing “soft” cooperation within the 
Arctic Council, with all the Arctic states and the native people involved, could 
be strengthened and enhanced, and be given a higher public and political 
profile by being placed on a firm legal footing in an international agreement 
and in a formal international/regional organisation with the power to take 
decisions. 
Conclusion
 Relations between states in the Arctic are by no means as negative as many 
people believe. Journalists and political scientists like to see conflict, as it is 
their job to report it, analyse it and comment on it. Conflict is news; coop-
eration is boring and ignored. However, lawyers have a broader view, because 
they see the legal structures, as well as the political differences, and they under-
stand that environmental issues and technical problems (like navigation 
through ice-covered waters) need and to a large extent, already have legal solu-
tions. Th ere is a firm legal structure providing a solution for many Arctic 
issues with a potential for much more. Th e principles and rules for establish-
ing maritime boundaries and the outer limits of the continental shelf are set 
88  Canada-U.S. Agreement on Arctic Cooperation, 11 January 1988, C.T.S. 1988/29. 
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out in the LOSC—the Constitution for the Oceans—and all of the states 
involved are pursuing those routes. Only once all the boundaries are settled 
can the exploitation of resources begin. However, before that can happen, 
precautionary measures have to be adopted to ensure that the environment is 
protected as much as possible. 
 Th is would require the elaboration of a regional seas agreement for the Arc-
tic that reiterates the general principles in Part XII of the LOSC as well as 
those in the UNFSA, including the precautionary approach and the ecosys-
tem approach. Th e agreement should include specific measures set out in 
annexes or protocols covering issues commonly addressed in other regional 
agreements, such as: monitoring, environmental impact assessment, land-
based activities, waste management, ocean dumping, contingency planning 
and emergency response, environmental impacts of oil and gas exploitation, 
conservation of biodiversity, conservation and management of fisheries, ship-
ping, air pollution and possibly bioprospecting. Provisions concerning con-
tinuing cooperation in scientific research are crucial, as the Arctic is being 
relentlessly transformed by the uncertain but potentially disastrous conse-
quences of rapid climate change. A sustainable development plan should be 
elaborated on the basis of the Arctic Marine Protection Strategy and its fol-
low-up, as well as subsequent scientific assessments. Th e action plan should be 
formally adopted and then implemented through a series of legally binding 
measures and decisions. 
 Th e crisis in the Arctic has arrived, urgent action is required to protect the 
environment and marine ecosystem, and the relevant principles and prece-
dents exist. Since they share a common ocean and common challenges and 
since they already cooperate to a considerable extent, the Arctic states should 
find the political will to go one step further to organise and consolidate their 
efforts in a new regional seas agreement and a forward-looking plan for sus-
tainable development in the Arctic. 
